

## NOTES ON SERTORIUS

The recent publication of a much-needed dissertation concerning Quintus Sertorius prompts a re-examination of certain points within that figure's career<sup>1</sup>). First, his date of birth. Spann rejects the generally accepted date of *c.* 123<sup>2</sup>); he argues for a date *c.* 126<sup>3</sup>). Let us examine the arguments<sup>4</sup>).

Granted that what we know with assurance is that S served under Q. Servilius Caepio in Gaul during 105 (Plut., *Sert.* 3.1).

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1) *Quintus Sertorius: Citizen, Soldier, Exile* (Diss. U. of Texas at Austin, 1976) by P.O. Spann, University Microfilms International, the only full-scale study of Sertorius [= S] in English, and the first in any language, to my knowledge, for many years. Some of the points to be discussed I have treated previously in "The Siege of Rome in 87 B.C.", *CP* 71 (1976), 328-336; and "Studies on the Period of Cinna and Sulla", *AC* 45 (1976), 497-549 (especially 498-518). Though I am in agreement with Dr. Spann's general conclusions, as well as with many of his individual interpretations, certain of his views and arguments do appear questionable. Hence, this study.

2) E. g., A. Schulten, *Sertorius* (Leipzig, 1926), 26: "spätestens 122 v. Chr.", based on Plut., *Sert.* 3.1. I have purposely avoided further references to Schulten's book, hitherto, I believe, the only full-scale study of S during the present century. Similarly, my absence of reference to the greatest modern admirer of S, Mommsen, is intentional. It is time for a fresh approach, which Spann, at the very least, deserves credit for attempting. Cf. V. Ehrenberg, "Sertorius", in *Ost und West: Studien zur geschichtlichen Problematik der Antike* (Brünn, 1935), 180: "Etwa im Jahre 122 v. Chr. geboren"; L. Wickert, "Sertorius", in *Rastloses Schaffen. Festschrift für Dr. F. Lammert* (Stuttgart, 1954), 97: "um 123 geboren"; and J. Van Ooteghem, *Pompée le Grand: Bâtitseur d'Empire* (Namur, 1954), 96. The report of F.L.G. Stenten, *Ploutarchos' Leven van Sertorius. Tekst, Nederlandse Vertaling, Historisch Kommentar* (Nijmegen, 1969), "Zusammenfassung" (the German summaries at the end of his book), p. 103, Comm. to Chapter II, that "Q. Sertorius wurde 121 v. Chr. ... geboren" not only clashes with his own report, p. 104, Comm. to Chap. III, that "Im Alter von 17 Jahren erlebte er [i. e., S] mit dem Prokonsul Caepio die Niederlage gegen die Kimbern und Teutonen bei Arausio", inasmuch as the Battle of Arausio occurred in October, 105 (cf. Stenten, p. 63), but also would mean that S attained the praetorship early, since 83 is the likely date for his holding the office. Stenten's commentary must, I regret to say, be used with caution.

3) Cf. C. Nicolet, *L'Ordre Équestre à L'Époque Républicaine* (312-43 av. J.-C.). Tome 2. *Prosopographie des Chevaliers Romains* (Paris, 1974), No. 324 on pp. 1022-1023: "*ca.* 127-73", without full elaboration.

4) To some extent, I play the devil's advocate in this often speculative study.

The further suggestion (Spann, p. 4) that the young man went out to Gaul with the consul Caepio in 106, as a *contubernalis*, is very plausible. However, Spann, p. 2, appears to me to be pressing Plutarch too closely when he maintains that Plutarch places S's legal/oratorical activity and consequent acquisition of some influence at Rome definitely "before his 'brilliant successes in war turned his ambition in this direction' (*Sert.* 2)" (Spann's italics)<sup>5</sup>).

If we consider the actual text of Plutarch, *Sert.* 2.2–3.1<sup>6</sup>), we see that it is true that the "πρῶτον" with which Chapter III begins is more a word of transition<sup>7</sup>), than a simple adverb accompanying "στρατενόμενος"<sup>8</sup>). Also, Spann does well to

5) Nicolet, *L'Ordre Équestre*, II, p. 1022, makes essentially the same argument. Note that Cic., *Brutus* 180 – "Sed omnium oratorum sive rabulorum, qui et plane indocti et inurbani aut rustici etiam fuerunt, quos quidem ego cognoverim, solutissimum in dicendo et acutissimum iudico nostri ordinis Q. Sertorium, equestris..." – indicates native ability rather than formal training in oratory. However, Cicero's political bias must be considered, while, in any case, the context (*Brutus* 176–180) points to the eighties B.C. To be sure, Plutarch and Sallust are even more likely to have overrated S's oratory than Cicero is to have underrated it. Cf., concerning the Memmii, Sall., *B.J.* 30.4, and Cic., *Brutus* 136. Incidentally, Sall., *Hist.* 1.87M – "Togam paludamento mutavit" – cannot be used to buttress any argument concerning S. Though B. Maurenbrecher, *C. Sallusti Crispi Historiarum Reliquiae*, Fasc. II (Stuttgart, 1967 repr. of 1893 ed.), Comm., following the tentative interpretation of R. Dietsch, *Gai Sallusti Crispi Quae Supersunt*, II (Leipzig, 1859), *Hist. Inc.* 65D, sees a reference to S – indeed, Dietsch, precisely to Plut., *Sert.* 2 and the move from oratory to military service – the fragment could just as well refer to another point in S's life or, in fact, to the life of many other persons. Cf., e.g., E. Tiffou, *Essai sur la Pensée Morale de Salluste à la Lumière de Ses Prologues* (Paris, 1974), 495, n. 29.

6) "Ἠσκητο μὲν οὖν καὶ περὶ δίκας ἰκανῶς, καὶ τινα καὶ δύνανται ἐν τῇ πόλει μειράκιον ὄν ἀπὸ τοῦ λέγειν ἔσχεν. αἱ δὲ περὶ τὰ στρατιωτικὰ λαμπρότητες αὐτοῦ καὶ κατορθώσεις ἐνταῦθα τὴν φιλοτιμίαν μετέστησαν. 3. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν Κίμβρων καὶ Τεντόνων ἐμβεβληκότων εἰς Γαλατίαν στρατενόμενος ὑπὸ Καίπιωνι, κακῶς ἀγωνισαμένων τῶν Ῥωμαίων καὶ τροπῆς γενομένης, ἀποβληκῶς τὸν ἵππον καὶ κατατετριμένος τὸ σῶμα τὸν Ῥοδανὸν διεπέρασεν, αὐτῷ τε τῷ θώρακι καὶ θυρεῷ πρὸς ἐναντίον ῥεῦμα πολὺ νηχόμενος. οὕτω τὸ σῶμα ὥμα-λέον ἦν αὐτῷ καὶ διάπονον τῇ ἀσκήσει." (Budé text of R. Flacelière and E. Chambry.) Note that the phrase "τὰ στρατιωτικὰ λαμπρότητες" appears to refer to the deed under Caepio, introduced by "πρῶτον μὲν οὖν", while "αἱ ... κατορθώσεις" appears to refer to his spy mission under Marius, introduced by "Δεύτερον δὲ" (*Sert.* 3.2–4).

7) As, e.g., in the Loeb translation of B. Perrin (*Plutarch's Lives*, Vol. VIII, *Sertorius* [Cambridge, Mass., 1919]), p. 7.

8) As in the recent Budé translation of Flacelière and Chambry, (*Plutarque, Vies*, Tome VIII, *Sertorius* [Paris, 1973]), p. 13.

draw attention to Plutarch's mention of "τὰ στρατιωτικὰ λαμπρότητες". In fact, though, how much of a "brilliant success" was his swimming across the Rhone? A fine show of youthful endurance, yes. Glorious? No<sup>9</sup>). To be one of the very few survivors of a major Roman defeat was scarcely glorious. Would this feat really have redirected S's ambition from the courts to the fields of battle (Plut., *Sert.* 2.2)? In fact, Plutarch may well be reading into S's life his own belief that oratory is a pursuit of the second rank, a means to a higher end<sup>10</sup>). Caepio himself, moreover, was largely to blame for the disaster; indeed, he suffered abrogation of his proconsular *imperium*, conviction, confiscation of his property, and exile<sup>11</sup>). What "glory" for S in all this?

9) Contrary to the assertion of B. Scardigli, in her excellent study "Sulle Fonti della Biografia Plutarchea di Sertorio", *SIFC* N.S. 43 (1971), 43-44, Plutarch is likely to have found the story in Sallust's *Historiae* (though very possibly in Posidonius also [Scardigli, pp. 52-53]); see now Spann, pp. 210ff.; also, Scardigli, *op. cit.*, 54; and W. Stahl, *De Bello Sertoriano* (Diss. Erlangen, 1907), 6, with citation of curious later accretions. Plutarch (or Sallust) may well have embellished the tale, perhaps partly on the model of the Horatius Cocles story (cf. Livy 2.10), though, of course, S was not yet one-eyed. Moreover, Horatius had accomplished a crucial mission first. Note that Julius Caesar performed a somewhat analogous feat during the *Bellum Alexandrinum* (*B. Alex.* 21; Suet., *Jul.* 64; Flor. 2.13.59; Dio Cassius 42.40; and Orosius 6.15.34). Interestingly, the more reportorial *B. Alex.* makes little of the event, while Suetonius and Plutarch, following some earlier source(s), embellish the swim and present it as a noteworthy accomplishment. The fact that the battle itself - as distinct from the campaign - was a defeat costing hundreds of lives is lost to sight. Cf. M. Gelzer, *Caesar: Politician and Statesman*, Trans. P. Needham [from the Sixth German Ed.] (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), 250 and n. 7, with further ancient references; and J. Carcopino, *Julius César*<sup>6</sup> (Paris, 1968), 424. Caesar, moreover, was a fifty-two-year-old *imperator* at the time, not a young *contubernalis*. Cf. P. Treves, "Sertorio", *Athenaeum* N.S. 10 (1932), 145 and n. 1, suggesting that the report that S's will named as his chief heir Perperna, his chief assassin (App., *B. C.* 1.114.531-2), was a reflection of Caesar's will (App., *B. C.* 2.143; adoption in the second degree of Decimus Brutus). For other parallels between S and Caesar, see n. 62, below. Sir R. Syme, *Sallust* (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1964), 133-34, argues against interpreting the portrayal of Sempronia by Sallust, *B. C.* 25, as a negative reminder of D. Brutus, her step-son (rather than son, Syme tentatively suggests). P. McGushin, *C. Sallustius Crispus. Bellum Catilinae. A Commentary* (Leiden, 1977), pp. 164 and 302-303, is non-committal. Cf. K. Vretska, *Sallust. De Catilinae Coniuratione*, I (Heidelberg, 1976), 347-348.

10) Cf. A. Wardman, *Plutarch's Lives* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1974), 226.

11) Cic., *Balb.* 28, *Brutus* 135, and *De Orat.* 2.124.198-200; "Cic.", *ad Herenn.* 1.14.24; Ascon. p. 78C; Livy, *Per.* 67; Val. Max. 4.7.3 and

In fact, I believe that there is no need to maintain that Plutarch clearly places S's oratorical activity chronologically prior to his military service. A scenario in which S pursued both activities during his late teens would seem both plausible and in accord with Plutarch's account. Plut., *Sert.* 2.2, appears to me to be making more of a general observation (for the reason cited in the preceding paragraph) than a strictly chronological report (the former, with its moral implications, interested the biographer far more than the latter). Then, too, even if one were to insist that S did achieve some measure of oratorical reputation before beginning military service, at age *seventeen*, these circumstances are by no means incredible (cf. Spann, p. 3). Note, e.g., that in 56 Sempronius Atratinus, at the age of *seventeen*, prosecuted Caelius Rufus (F. Münzer, *RE* IIA, 1366ff. [1923]).

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6.9.13; Gran. Licin. pp. 11-13F; and Orosius 5.16. Cf. Eutrop. 5.1.1-2. The fact that S's first military campaign ended in utter disaster due to *political discord* may well have made a lasting impression on the young S. His relative moderation in 87, his "distaste (especially after Sulla was dead) for the pointless civil strife in Spain" (Spann, 207), as well as his alienation by Sulla's March of 88, argued below, may in part be traced to this early experience. Cf. D. Gillis, "Quintus Sertorius", *Istituto Lombardo, Accad. di Sc. e Lett. Classe di Lett. e Sc. Mor. e Stor. Rendiconti* vol. 103 (1969), 727: "Sertorius was a soldier, with a soldier's respect for law and order". This non-political interpretation appears apt, especially, I maintain, with regard to S's attitude toward Sulla's March and outlawry of Marius. Cf. n. 20, below. On the other hand, note, by way of analogy, that Q. Lutatius Catulus the elder, brother-in-law of Q. Caepio the elder, after experiencing three *repulsae* as a *bonus* (apparently), gained a consulship of 102 as a *Marianus*, only to leave Marius's orbit subsequently and return to his earlier aristocratic associations (so, E. Badian, "Caepio and Norbanus", *Studies in Greek and Roman History* [Oxford, 1964; from *Historia*, 1957], 37-38 and 51; and *idem*, *Lucius Sulla: The Deadly Reformer*, Seventh Todd Memorial Lecture [Sydney, 1969], 9-10; cf. now R.G. Lewis, "Catulus and the Cimbri, 102 B.C.", *Hermes* 102 [1974], 94-95, and 107, n. 58, pertinent, but not persuasive, in view of Marius's consecutive consulships). In the case of S (here I anticipate somewhat), we find him serving under Caepio, the *patronus Senatus* (Val. Max. 6.9.13) and *triumphator*, then, after that factious figure's political catastrophe, serving under Marius, and, finally, from 97 to 93 (I believe), as *tr. mil.* under the well-connected *consularis* and *triumphator*, though *novus*, Didius, at a time when Marius was no longer quite so influential, and may have been viewed, in Pompey's later *mot* to Sulla, as a *setting sun*. While granting the obvious point that a young *vir militaris* had to follow the wars and the generals assigned to command, one wonders if the roster of S's attested military commanders does not reveal a migration similar to, in fact somewhat synchronous with, that of Catulus (and, of course, others, such as Sulla). Regrettably, all hypothetical!

Further, the spy mission under Marius, which Spann, pp. 8–9, plausibly dates to 102, and which would have gained S his first *genuine* successes (“*αἱ . . . κατορθώσεις*” of Plut., *Sert.* 2.2), would thus have occurred when S was about twenty-one. So much, it seems, for the objection of Spann, p. 3, that “Plutarch uses the expression *μειράκιον* to describe S at the time of his oratorical activity” and that “Plutarch uses this term loosely to describe anyone from 17 through his late twenties, but he uses it most often to describe young men around 20 years old”. Not only is this objection seemingly met, but it is rather vague at the outset.

While Spann is correct that S, as an *eques*, need not have begun his military service at age 17<sup>12</sup>), the fact remains that he

12) Spann’s statement (as an argument by analogy), p. 3, that Marius, another *novus* of equestrian origin, “began his military service at the age of 23”, (italics added), taking M’s service at Numantia as his first, is not unassailable. Sall., *B.J.* 63.4 – “[Marius] . . . ubi primum actas militiae patiens fuit, stipendiis faciendis, . . . sese exercuit” – clearly indicates an earlier military initiation, as, indeed, M’s overall career and character might lead one to believe. To be sure, it is very possible that these and other factors misled Sallust (cf. text and n. 22, below). Note that M’s only known marriage and the birth of his homonymous son also occurred rather late, when he was already in his middle to late forties (cf. Katz, “The First Fruits of Sulla’s March”, *AC* 44 [1975], 107). However, it is also possible that Plutarch’s explicit assertion that M’s first service was against the Celtiberians, under Scipio (*Marius* 3.2), was an error, due to M’s having failed to gain *gloria* during previous service. Unlikely? Then consider: what do we know of M’s career *afterwards*, during the 120’s? (See text and n. 22, below. I should, perhaps, emphasize that I regard this approach as distinct from the issue of whether M was military tribune at Numantia. Hence, I pass over Val. Max. 8.15.7.) One might even argue that if Marius had abstained from serving earlier (i.e., from c. 140 onward) in Spain, the strong hostile historiographical tradition would have highlighted this fact against the dark background of defeat and draft avoidance. Unlike the case of S, whose career would fit birth c. 123 and praetorship c. 83 well (cf. G.V. Sumner, *The Orators in Cicero’s “Brutus”*: *Prosopography and Chronology* [Toronto, 1973], 107–108), M’s career offers us no such handle. Cf. C. Nicolet, “Armée et Société à Rome sous la République: à propos de l’ordre équestre”, in *Problèmes de la Guerre à Rome*, Ed. J.-P. Brisson (Paris and The Hague, 1969), 143 (Unfortunately, Nicolet, *L’Ordre Équestre*, II, No. 223 on p. 944, with notes, confuses M’s service under Scipio with his later legateship under Metellus. However, by lowering the date of M’s military tribunate “vers 124 ou 123” [n. 2 on p. 945], the French scholar seems to indicate a change of heart.); and H. Chantraine, “Der *cursus honorum* des Marius und die *lex Villia Annalis*”, in *Untersuchungen zur römischen Geschichte am Ende des 2. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (Kallmünz, 1959), 65–66, a detailed discussion. Contra, Badian, “Marius and the Nobles”, *Durham Univ. Journal*, 1964, 143–144; and T.F. Carney, *A Biography of C. Marius*, *PACA* Suppl. 1 (Assen,

surely *could* have done so. S, as Spann, p. 7, notes, may have returned to Rome with Caepio in late 105/early 104. He need not have joined Marius's staff immediately. Indeed, he may have recovered from his wounds sufficiently to plead at the bar for some time before he was well enough to return to active military duty. War wounds might prove helpful at the bar, as they may well have done for S later in political life (cf. Sall., *Hist.* 1.88M). Also, it is conceivable that S served part of the year and spent the off-season back in Rome.

As for Plut., *Sert.* 13.1-2<sup>13</sup>), the reference to Metellus Pius as “προσβύτερος” in 79, when he was probably *c.* fifty years old, may have limited significance (so, essentially, Spann, p. 6), but one is not justified in stating that “Plutarch clearly did not know how old Metellus was at the time” (Spann, p. 6). The passage does *not* “clearly” indicate this. Moreover, Metellus was an important figure, and one about whom Plutarch must have read a great deal. Even in the surviving literature<sup>14</sup>), we find the tale of Metellus Numidicus's arrogance and opposition to Marius's consular ambitions, along with a reference to that Metellus's son, Pius, and *his age* (within a year or so, in Sallust's text). Clearly, it was a well-known story, one known to Plutarch. What is more, Plutarch seems to have written a *Life* of Metellus Numidicus<sup>15</sup>). No, if Plutarch knew simple arithmetic, then he *could* have determined Metellus's age in 79.

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Netherlands, 1961), 15-16. The opposing view of M's career followed by Spann is, I believe, usually preferred. Note also Badian, *op. cit.*, 144, n. 6, concerning the word “μειράκιον”.

13) “Ἐτι δ' αὐτὸς μὲν ἤδη προσβύτερος ἦν, καὶ τι καὶ πρὸς ἀνεμμένην ἤδη καὶ τρυφερὰν διαίταν ἐκ πολλῶν ἀγῶνων καὶ μεγάλων ἐνδεδικώς, τῷ δὲ Σεργιωρῶν συνειστέλει πνεύματος ἀκμαίον γέμοντι καὶ κατασκευασμένον ἔχοντι θαυμασίως τὸ σῶμα ῥώμῃ καὶ τάχει καὶ λιτότητι. 2 Μέθις μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ ῥαθυμῶν ἤπιετο, πόρους δὲ μεγάλους καὶ μικρὰς ὁδοιπορίας καὶ συνεχεῖς ἀγρυπνίας ὀλίγοις εἴθιστο καὶ φαύλοις ἀρκούμενος σιτίοις διαφέρειν, πλάνοις δὲ χρώμενος αἰεὶ καὶ κωμηγεσίοις, ὁπότε σχολάζοι, πάσης διεκδύσεως φεύγοντι καὶ διώκοντι κνκλώσεως ἀβάτων τε καὶ βυσίμων τόπων ἐμπειρίαν προειλήφει.” (Budé text.) Cf. Gillis, *op. cit.* in n. 11, p. 721. See also, however, Plut., *Sert.* 18.1, 21.2, and *Pomp.* 8.6.

14) See Sall., *B.J.* 64.4: “Is [i.e., Metellus Pius] eo tempore [i.e., in 108] contubernio patris ibidem militabat, annos natus circiter viginti”; and Plut., *Marius* 8.6. Cf. Dio 26.89.3. I discussed the tale briefly in *CP*, 1976, 335-336.

15) Plut., *Marius* 29.12. Cf. K. Ziegler, *Plutarchos von Chaironeia*<sup>2</sup> (Stuttgart, 1964), column 259 (reprinted from *RE* 21 [1951]; Flacelière and Chambry, *Plutarque. Vie*s, VI, p. 132, n. 2; and E. Valgiglio, *Plutarco: Vita di Mario* (Florence, 1956), p. 139. Note that B. Scardigli, *SIFC*, 1971, 33-41

Though I agree with Spann's argument that Plutarch (like Sallust) was, overall, more concerned with Metellus's "training and habits" (p. 6), the fact remains that "προσβύτερος" manifestly refers to age, in the context (*Sert.* 13.1), indeed, age *relative* to that of Sertorius. Obviously, an age difference between Metellus and S of about six years (birth in 129 and *c.* 123, respectively) would suit the passage better than one of only about three years (129 to *c.* 126)<sup>16</sup>. So far, then, it appears that it is still reasonable to hold that S was born *c.* 123.

Spann, pp. 4-5, also advances the hypothesis that S belonged, at least nominally, to the *clientela* of the Servilii Caepiones. Since Q. Servilius Caepio had celebrated a triumph in October of 107 (*MRR* 1.552), S may merely have considered him an excellent choice as a prospective commander, to the

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and 64, tentatively places the *Sertorius* among the latest biographies of Plutarch.

16) It may not be coincidental that, if the six-year age differential is accepted, then Metellus (aged *c.* 50) would have been a *senior*, while S (aged *c.* 44) would still have been a *junior*. Might this petty detail and/or Plutarch's lack of thorough familiarity with Latin lie behind the passage at issue? Concerning Plutarch's lack of fluency in Latin and related factors, see H. Peter, *Die Quellen Plutarchs in den Biographien der Römer* (Halle, 1865; repr. Amsterdam, 1965), 61, n.; H. Radnitzky, *Plutarchs Quellen in der Vita des Sertorius, Jahresberichte des K. K. Akad. Gymn.* (Vienna, 1909), 5-6; C. P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* (Oxford, 1971), 81-87; A. E. Wardman, "Plutarch's Methods in the Lives", *CQ* 21 (1971), 259; D. A. Russell, *Plutarch* (N. Y., 1973), 54; and E. Valgiglio, "L'Autobiografia di Silla nelle Biografie di Plutarco", *Studi Urbinati* N. S. B 49, No. 1 (1975), 246-249. Also, see, e.g., Scardigli, *SIFC*, 1971, 57, for an argument that the comparison in Chapter Thirteen derives from Sallust, who, it may be noted, did use the words "iuniores" (*Hist.* 2.87C M) and "senior(um)" (*Hist.* 2.92M), indeed, within the same book of the *Historiae* as contained discussion of Metellus. Cf., e.g., O. Pecere, "Un Frammento di Sallustio tra Propaganda e Polemica Storiografica", *RFIC* 104 (1976), 402-403. Note Tac., *Ann.* 1.3.7, using "iuniores ... senes" non-technically (?) of those born after and before the Battle of Actium, as viewed *Ab Excessu Divi Augusti* (31 B.C. to 14 A.D.). As Stahl, *De Bello Sertoriano*, 4 and 11, rightly stresses, Plutarch's literary style was far more expansive than the *brevitas* of Sallust. Hence, Plutarch would often have expanded Sallustian expressions (cf. n. 23, below), not always accurately, one might add. Then, too, Sallust had a predilection for varying technical terms and set phrases; cf., e.g., A. J. Woodman, "Review of U. Paananen: *Sallust's Politico-Social Terminology...*", *JRS* 63 (1973), 293; and R. Syme, *Sallust*, 261-265. Note, finally, the provocative interpretation of A. La Penna, "Le 'Historiae': la crisi della 'res publica' ... " in *Sallustio e la Rivoluzione Romana* (Milan, 1968; from *Athenaeum*, 1963), 272, that even the character of S was probably "meno complesso e ricco di contraddizioni" in Sallust than in Plutarch. Cf. Syme, *Sallust*, 204.

extent that the choice was his. Caepio's eminence, both military and political (Val. Max. 6.9.13), may have attracted S's loyalty, in view of the prospects for reward. S's initial service, as a very young *contubernalis*, need not have committed him (at least, not irrevocably) to any political allegiance. Note, e.g., the case of another young *eques*, Cicero, who served under *both* Pompeius Strabo (Cic., *Phil.* XII. 27) and Sulla (Plut., *Cic.* 3) during the Social War. The later bond – such as it was – between Cicero and Pompey (Magnus) appears to me a case of the orator's purposely attaching himself to a powerful figure for his own benefit<sup>17</sup>), benefit of a sort not apt to have accrued to S from attachment to the Caepiones after 105. Caepio's enormous military and political disaster would scarcely have encouraged close association. To be sure, as Spann, p. 16, correctly notes, Titus Didius (*cos.* 98) was associated with the Servillii Caepiones and the Metellan *factio*<sup>18</sup>). With the exile in 103 of Caepio, *cos.* 106, there was no Caepio with any seniority (I have in mind praetorian rank) for over a decade, while Didius had already celebrated a triumph in 100–99 after his praetorship, and held his consulship (of 98) together with Q. Metellus Nepos. Granted that Didius was a *novus homo*, but a *consularis* and *triumphator*, an ambitious, well-connected *vir militaris*, would surely be an adequate patron, if one need be sought. What is more, Didius may have been a Sabine<sup>19</sup>), as was S.

17) Cf. the perceptive observations of W.S. Anderson, *Pompey, His Friends, and the Literature of the First Century B.C.*, *U. of Cal. Pub. in Cl. Philol.* 19,1 (1963), 27 and 52, though I believe that Anderson may overestimate the closeness of the relationship, at least from Pompey's viewpoint (cf. *ibid.*, p. 73, n. 54).

18) Cf. Badian, *Studies*, 53; and E.S. Gruen, *Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts, 149–78 B.C.* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), 164–165.

19) Cf. L.R. Taylor, *The Voting Districts of the Roman Republic: The Thirty-Five Urban and Rural Tribes* (Rome, 1960), 210, although Titus Didius appears to have belonged to the tribe *Cornelia* (cf. Badian, "Notes on Roman Senators of the Republic", *Historia* 12 [1963], 143; and T.P. Wiseman, *New Men in the Roman Senate, 139 B.C. – 14 A.D.* [Oxford, 1971], No. 156 on p. 229), while S's *patria* Nursia was in the *Quirina*, to which the "Γάιος Δίδιος Γαίου Κυρίνα", No. 20 in the *Consilium* of the *SC de Agro Pergameno*, also belongs. In *AC*, 1976, 509 and n. 41, I failed to distinguish between the two Didii, C. and T. However, Badian, *Historia*, 1963, 132, points out that "Differences in tribes occur in many families obviously related, ...". Hence, if the two Didii are related, a special bond between T. Didius and S remains a possibility.

W. Durant's claim, with apparent reference to Didius's triumph-hunting in Spain, that S was "shocked by the brutalities of empire" and



One might, indeed, argue, hypothesis for hypothesis, that Didius was S's link with the Servilii Caepiones. S *may* have served under Didius in Macedonia (denied by Spann, p. 15), though we simply do not know. It must be remembered that, following his service under Caepio and his presence at the débâcle of Arausio, S served under Marius, probably for several years. His noted spy mission gained him a decoration, while continued superior service earned him, we are told, renown and the general's "πίστις" (Plut., *Sert.* 3.4). Furthermore, as Spann, p. 14, perceptively notes, S clearly learned his military abc's from Marius. The young man must have had great respect for his great mentor. Hence, for S's commanders, we have, thus far, Caepio, Marius, then a question mark, and Didius. No *clear* political (or factional) allegiance can be discerned; little may have been present<sup>20</sup>.

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"went over to the Spaniards" (*Caesar and Christ: A History of Roman Civilization and of Christianity...* [N.Y., 1944], 136) is a mixture of improbability and inaccuracy. Of course, D's work, though perceptive, is not a scholarly study.

20) Ehrenberg, "Sertorius", in *Ost und West*, 180, maintained that Sulla's opposition "traf Sertorius vermutlich überraschend, da er sich bisher politisch nicht betätigt hatte". While it is true, as I have noted, that the surviving record does not reveal consistent factional alignment thus far, this point does not establish Ehrenberg's "surprise". Note the blanket assertion of H. Berve, "Sertorius", *Hermes* 64 (1929), 218, n. 1, that "Sein [i.e., S's] früheres Leben, auch seine Quaestur..., sind ohne politische Bedeutung". Cf. J. Carcopino, *Histoire Romaine*. Tome II. *La République Romaine de 133 à 44 avant J.-C. César*<sup>4</sup> (Paris, 1950; original ed., 1935), 540: "son indifférence à la politique". For a possible hole in Berve's "blanket" and Carcopino's "indifférence", see the final portion of n. 11, above. In addition, as I sought to point out in *AC*, 1976, 512, the momentous events of 88, Sulla's March and the outlawry of Marius, which I date *before* the tribunician elections, can scarcely have failed to make a profound impact upon S. Cf. Ehrenberg, *Ost und West*, 181 and 199. Then, too, S and Sulla had very probably met years before (under Marius). As for Ehrenberg's claim that "... das ganze große Leben des Sertorius spricht dafür, daß seine Zugehörigkeit zu den Popularen doch tiefer begründet war [than upon Sulla's effecting his defeat for the tribunate]" (p. 181; see also pp. 199f.), strong personal feelings, i.e., *dolor* at Sulla's infringement of his *dignitas* would have been a sufficient (though I do not say that it was S's *sole*) initial impulse to action, if not for a modern historian, at least for a Roman of the Late Republic. Do we really *know* that S was more "democratic" or even more sincerely "popularis" (if this phraseology is not oxymoronic: cf. R.F. Rossi, "La crisi della Repubblica", in *Nuove Questioni di Storia Antica* [Milan, 1968], 415-416; and J. Martin, *Die Popularen in der Geschichte der späten Republik* [Diss. Freiburg i.Br., 1965], 223-224) than most of his contemporaries and social equals? Cf. Berve, *Hermes*, 1929, 218-219 and

## II

In brief, Spann, pp. 19ff., argues that S stayed in Spain beyond the date of Didius's departure, then returned to Rome in 92, held the quaestorship in 91, and then unsuccessfully sought the tribunate in 89 (for 88). I question each of these points (see n. 4, above).

First, the date of his return from Spain. To be sure, nowhere are we explicitly told the date. What is more, the generally accepted date of 93 (*MRR* 2.13), involving the belief that S returned together with Didius, who is known to have celebrated his second triumph in June, 93<sup>21</sup>), is problematic since, as Spann, p. 19, notes, Plutarch states that S was elected *quaestor* "ὅτε πρῶτον ἐπανήκεν εἰς Πώμην" (*Sert.* 4.1). Spann suggests two errors by Plutarch: the first, that S need not have returned with Didius; and the second, that "it makes better sense to place his quaestorship in the year 91".

As to S's departure date, if, as I postulate, S was closely associated with Didius (and S's protracted service under the latter as military tribune points this way), then would it not seem likely that S *would* return with Didius? This scenario, on the other hand, might also appear to call for S to seek office *quam celerrime* after Didius's triumph, as Plutarch's text suggests. A problem (see text below, also n. 29).

Spann, pp. 19–20, correctly notes that the governor of Hispania Citerior following Didius, C. Valerius Flaccus, did face brief military activity in the form of a mini-rebellion (Appian, *Ib.* 100). S, according to Spann, p. 20, stayed on in Spain to help the new governor, but since the fighting ended (probably) by summer of 92, he left *then* and still had time to return to Rome and gain election to the quaestorship in 92 (for 91). This scenario is possible, but I do not find it at all compelling.

I believe that the connection with Didius and a joint return from Spain in 93 are to be preferred. What of the resultant inaccuracy in Plutarch? I suggest that it is just that, inaccuracy (though only *one*, not two errors, as Spann, p. 19, maintains). Plutarch may have been attempting to connect chronologically

223; Treves, *Athenaeum*, 1932, 147; A.K.E. Wiehn, *Die illegalen Heereskommanden in Rom bis auf Caesar* (Diss. Marburg, 1926), 38; A. La Penna, *Sallustio*, 252 and 274; and Wickert, "Sertorius", in *Rastloses Schaffen*, 103–104.

21) *MRR* 2.15. Cf. Stenten, *Plutarchos' Leven van Sertorius*, p. 65, Comm. to Plutarch, *Sert.* 4, misdating the triumph to 94.

the limited facts available on S's early life. He may well not have known (and, to be frank, probably did not really care) when Didius returned from Spain and triumphed. Plutarch's major (though not, I believe, *sole*) source for this Life, Sallust, in his *Historiae*, may not have provided great detail on this phase of S's life. Others are not apt to have done so either (see Sall., *Hist.* 1.88M, in n. 23, below). Moreover, it may be instructive to recall Sallust's curious description of *Marius's* early career (*B.J.* 63.4-5), overly complimentary to the point of inaccuracy, though still the only source to attest (explicitly) an elective military tribunate<sup>22</sup>). If Sallust went astray in presenting the career of the much-maligned Marius, a major figure, as one success after another, might he not have erred, indeed been *more* apt to err, similarly, in presenting the career of his special hero, the even more maligned Sertorius: "No sooner did he return to Rome than he was elected quaestor..."<sup>23</sup>) With Plutarch's

22) "... ubi primum tribunatum militarem a populo petit, perisque faciem eius ignorantibus, facile (factis) notus per omnis tribus declaratur. Deinde ab eo magistratu [the elective military tribunate] alium, post alium sibi [i.e., Marius] peperit, semperque in potestatibus eo modo agitabat, ut ampliore quam gerebat dignus haberetur" (Sall., *B.J.* 63.4-5). *Vir.Ill.* 67.1 = "Gaius Marius ... primis honoribus per ordinem functus" - seems in general accord, though says little. See, however, Plut., *Marius* 5; Val. Max. 6.19.14; and Diod. Bks. 34/35.38.1.

Carney, *Biog. of Marius*, 15, n. 82 (following J. Suolahti, *The Junior Officers of the Roman Army in the Republican Period: A Study on Social Structure* [Helsinki, 1955], 62 and 182), observes that "Marius's military merit must have been exceptional as his is the only case specifically recorded in the sources where the metropolitan electorate elected a man of a politically unknown *gens* to a military tribunate solely on this account...". It would surely be foolish to deny M's "exceptional military merit". However, in view of the clear error in Sallust's account of M's preconsular career (seemingly denied by Carney, *op. cit.*, 16, n. 84), and the likely political tilt of that historian (much exaggerated, to be sure, in the past), it appears to me prudent to receive the Sallustian interpretation with some scepticism. Cf. Badian, "Review of A. Passerini: *Studi su Caio Mario* [reprint]", *Gnomon* 46 (1974), 422-423; and Carney, *Biog.*, 21 and n. 109. As Carney knows better than most, Marius was, at one point or another, a *cliens* of both the Caecillii Metelli and the Herennii, not to mention his early connection with Scipio Aemilianus. Cf. Badian, "Forschungsbericht. From the Gracchi to Sulla (1940-1959)" *Historia* 11 (1962) 216, reprinted in *The Crisis of the Roman Republic*. Ed. R. Seager (Cambridge, Eng., 1969). 22.

23) Cf. Stenten, *Ploutarchos' Leven van Sertorius*, p. 104 (summary) Comm. to Chapters IV-V: "Im Jahre 93 v. Chr. kehrte Sertorius nach Rom zurück und wurde Quaestor"! R. E. Smith, "Plutarch's Biographical Sources in the Lives", *CQ* 34 (1940), 6, n. 1, comments on P's lack of interest in chronology, while A. N. Sherwin-White, "Ariobarzanes, Mithridates, and Sulla", *CQ* N. S. 27 (1977), 177-178, stresses P's frequent chronological

concentration upon character and consequent imprecision, added to Sallust's well-known chronological inaccuracy and special appreciation for S, a reader should, unfortunately, expect such chronological (if not other) uncertainties.

Moreover, I differ with Spann (and others) who translate "συνισταμένον" as "threatening" or "about to break out"<sup>24</sup>. I believe that "breaking out" or "beginning" is equally acceptable. (Cf. *LSJ*, s.v. "συνίστημι", II.1, though see IV. c.) The Marsic (or Social) War "was beginning" in autumn, 91, not 92. Thus, I differ with Spann's assertion, p. 21, that "Even if the expression is taken to describe the conditions existing when Sertorius was *elected* questor, it would fit the situation in 92 as well as that in 91".

imprecision, if not inaccuracy (178, n. 28: "concealed time lag"). Sallust explicitly states that S was not properly treated by other writers: "Magna gloria tribunus militum in Hispania T. Didio imperante, magno usui bello Marsico paratu militum et armorum fuit, multaque tum ductu eius peracta primo per ignobilitatem, deinde per invidiam scriptorum incelebrata sunt..." (*Hist.* 1.88M). Surely a sufficient sign of Sallust's special interest, even if it did not contain the word "incelebrata", which, as Sir R. Syme, *Tacitus*, I (Oxford, 1958), 283 and n. 1, observed, occurs again *only* in Tac., *Ann.* 6.7.5, where the later historian wished to make an analogous point, as well as a literary allusion to his admired predecessor. See R. Renehan, "A Traditional Pattern of Imitation in Sallust and His Sources", *CP* 71 (1976), 97ff., for a perceptive study of this phenomenon, "borrowings" from passages with similar *contexts*, in which case the very act of borrowing constitutes a statement on a second level. Cf. E. Pasoli, "Osservazioni sul Proemio delle 'Historiae' di Sallustio", *Studi Urbinati* N.S. B 49, No. 1 (1975), 378-379. Note also, concerning S, that Sall., *Hist.* 1.88M, presents the two tours of duty, in Spain and during the Social War, back to back. Cf. Russell, *Plutarch*, 116.

I strongly endorse Spann's view, pp. 221-227, to the effect that Sallust was *not* critical of S, even during the latter's difficult, final period. Cf. Scardigli, *SIFC*, 1971, 41, n. 4; and W. Schur, *Sallust als Historiker* (Stuttgart, 1934), 218f. and 256, though I deny that Sallust considered S "der letzte große Republikaner". *Contra*, V. Pöschl, *Grundwerte römischer Staatsgesinnung in den Geschichtswerken des Sallust* (Berlin, 1960), 1, n. 2, and 112; and K. Büchner, *Sallust* (Heidelberg, 1960), 263 with n. 178, and 268; followed, alas, by U. Paananen, *Sallust's Politico-Social Terminology...* (Helsinki, 1972), 101. Even Syme, *Sallust*, 204-205, to some extent, succumbs. See also Treves, *Athenaeum*, 1932, 129; and La Penna, *Sallustio*, 252.

24) B. Perrin, in his (Loeb) translation of Plut., *Sert.* 4.2; and Stenten, *Plutarchos' Leven - "dreigde"*. Ian Scott-Kilvert, *Makers of Rome. Nine Lives by Plutarch. Sertorius* (Baltimore, 1965 [Penguin]) - "was just about to break out" - seems to follow the same approach. *Contra*, the new Budé translation of Flacelière and Chambry: "car la guerre des Marses commençait", Cf. Sumner, *The Orators*, 108.

The premonitory rumblings cited by Spann, p. 21, do *not* establish his thesis. Indeed, he cites a plot against the consuls of 91. The consul Philippus had to be informed of this development by his opponent, the *tr. pl.* M. Livius Drusus, who had close contacts with the Italian allies, as their patron<sup>25</sup>). Neither this specific plot nor a direct military threat from the *socii* would have been perceived in the autumn of 92. Overall, as I have sought to stress previously<sup>26</sup>), I fear that the Plutarch passage is not completely acceptable as it stands, though I cannot completely accept Spann's historical emendations, either. Uncertainty should be admitted.

This is doubly the case with the question of where and, in particular, under what commander(s) S served during the Social War. All that we know (Plut., *Sert.* 4.1-2) is that S served as quaestor in Cisalpine Gaul, where he enrolled troops. Since S had served in Gaul earlier, this was a natural assignment for him. Besides, as an experienced and skilled young *vir militaris*, he was very well suited to levy and train troops. This assignment, if held in 90, may have put him nominally under the command of the consul in the northern theater of the war, P. Rutilius Lupus, a Marian, commanding Marian officers<sup>27</sup>). The further report (Plut., *Sert.* 4.3) that S was advanced to a position of command does not specify area or superior commander.

As Spann, p. 23, notes, the northern army was nearer Cisalpine Gaul, but this is not a decisive argument. Cisalpine Gaul was a, if not *the* prime recruiting area at the time; note, e. g., the Servilius sent in 87 to recruit forces to defend the city of Rome

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25) Plut., *Cato Minor* 2; Appian, *B. C.* 1.35-36 and 38; Diod. 37.10-11 and 13; Orosius 5.18.1; Flor. 2.6; and *Vir. Ill.* 66. Cf. Gruen, *Roman Politics*, 211-213.

Note R. Gardner's assertion concerning "the outbreak of the revolt" in *CAH*, IX, *The Roman Republic, 133-44 B. C.* (Cambridge, Eng., 1932), 187, that "the Romans were certainly taken by surprise". See also E. T. Salmon, *Samnum and the Samnites* (Cambridge, Eng., 1967), 346-348, stressing Roman military preparations during "the winter of 91/90", a fact which militates against Spann's argument, p. 21, of earlier preparations, though see P. A. Brunt, "Italian Aims at the Time of the Social War", *JRS* 55 (1965), 92. Cf., however, Appian, *B. C.* 1.38.

26) *AC*, 1976, 509-10. Cf., however, Sumner, *The Orators*, 107-8. Indeed, note the recent assertion, with supporting argument, of the greatest authority on the period, E. Badian, "Rome, Athens and Mithridates", *AJAH* 1 (1976), 107, that "In the spring of 91 ... the Social War could not yet be foreseen by anyone: ..."; and Sherwin-White, *CQ*, 1977, 179.

27) Badian, *Studies*, 52, noted by Spann, 22 and n. 65.

against Cinna and Marius<sup>28</sup>). Furthermore, the patronage of the Servilii Caepiones, which Spann, p. 23, again hypothesizes, is, at this point, questionable. The disastrous experience under the elder Caepio at Arausio, the attested extended service and decoration under Marius, the extended service as military tribune under Didius, these attested facts scarcely establish – or accord well with – S as an adherent of the Caepiones.

Then, too, as Spann, p. 23, notes, by this time the younger Caepio, “now head of the family”, had broken with the Metellan *factio* and had aligned himself with Marius. I question whether S would have followed “the lead of his patron”. Aside from the considerable uncertainty as to whether the *younger* Caepio was *ever* S’s patron, we may legitimately doubt whether S would have joined in Caepio’s bitter personal dispute<sup>29</sup>). Didius, though an adherent of the elder Caepio, cannot be shown to have followed the younger Caepio’s lead. Rather, Didius was serving in the southern theater, with the *boni*. A consul and twice *triumphator*, Didius, the last *attested* commander of S, was surely a sufficient patron, *novus* though he was.

To be frank, we do not know S’s commander(s) during the Social War or the political aspects (if any) of his service then.

28) Appian, *B.C.* 1.67.308; and Gran. Licin., p. 20F. Cf. N. Criniti, *M. Aemilius Q. f. M. n. Lepidus, “Ut Ignis in Stipula”*. *Mem. d. Istit. Lombardo – Accad. di Sc. e Lett. Classe di Lett.-Sc. Mor. e Stor.* 30, 4 (Milan, 1969), 377–78.

29) Dio 28 fr. 96; Florus 2.5.4–6; and *Vir. Ill.* 66.8. See Badian, *Studies*, 40–2 and 55 ff.; J.P.V.D. Balsdon, “Review of Badian: *Studies*...”, *JRS* 55 (1965), 230; E.S. Gruen, “Political Prosecutions in the 90’s B.C.”, *Historia* 15 (1966), 44–5; and G. Calboli, “Su Alcuni Frammenti di Cornelio Sisenna”, *Studi Urbinati* N.S. B 49, No. 1 (1975), 171–2. Note that Sertorius was away in Spain when the dispute probably arose or, at least, escalated. It is just possible that the changed political context in which, as a result, Sertorius would have found himself upon his return was responsible for his postulated delay in seeking a quaestorship. Recall that in 92 (it seems) and again in early 90 Caepio even launched prosecutions against the old *Princeps Senatus* M. Aemilius Scaurus (as discussed by Badian, “*Quaestiones Variae*”, *Historia* 18 [1969], 467 ff., and *Studies*, 42–3 and 56; cf. R. Seager, “*Lex Varia de Maestate*”, *Historia* 16 [1967], 38–9 and 42), who had been a loyal supporter of Caepio’s own father (Cic., *De Orat.* 2.197). Would Sertorius have desired to associate himself (or maintain an association) with Caepio the Younger, in the light of the latter’s bitter *inimicitiae* with *principes* like Scaurus? Cf. Balsdon, *op. cit.*, 230: Caepio “a poor compensation” to the *Mariani* for the loss of M. Antonius!

## III

We now come to S's candidacy for the tribunate of the *plebs*. Was the candidacy in 89 or 88? As Spann, p. 24, correctly notes, 88 has been the date generally accepted<sup>30</sup>). He suggests, however, that "the evidence *clearly* places his defeat at the elections of 89" (only the first italics added, p. 24).

Since I have on another occasion discussed the chronological relationship between the elections of 88 (for 87) and Sulla's March<sup>31</sup>), I will not repeat myself<sup>32</sup>). However, Spann's new argument concerning Plut., *Sert.* 4.6-7<sup>33</sup>), does merit attention. Spann, p. 25, maintains that "ἐπει δὲ here clearly introduces events subsequent to those which have been recorded in the previous sentence". This passage does *not* "clearly" do so, rather, I maintain, Section Seven of Chapter Four simply changes focus, moves on to the events of Cinna's day (87) which, Plutarch states, occurred after Marius's flight. No chronological sequence between the tribunician candidacy and Marius's flight (hence also Sulla's March) is stated, implied, nor need be inferred.

Spann, pp. 27-28, proceeds to consider the elections of 89 (for 88) and Sulla's allegedly preponderant influence on that occasion. He finds that three of the six praetors elected then "seem to have favored Sulla", while both tribunes known to have been elected then were "supporters of the *boni* at the time of their election". In fact, of the praetors listed (Spann, n. 83 on

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30) E.g., Treves, *Athenaeum*, 1932, 131; Carcopino, *César*<sup>4</sup>, 540; Van Ooteghem, *Pompée*, 97; and B. Scardigli, "Sertorio: Problemi Cronologici", *Athenaeum* 49 (1971), 229ff. Cf. Wickert, "Sertorius", in *Rastloses Schaffen*, 98; and Katz, *AC*, 1976, 507-508.

31) *AC*, 1976, 498-513. Cf. Scardigli, *Athenaeum*, 1971, 235-236.

32) Unfortunately, Spann, p. 27, like T. J. Luce, in his fine article "Marius and the Mithridatic Command", *Historia* 19 (1970), 191, n. 128, follows Harold Bennett in believing that the Nonius and Servilius of Plut., *Sulla* 10.1-3, were *both* candidates for the tribunate. See, e.g., Badian, *Studios*, 83f.; and Katz, *AC*, 1976, 538-541.

33) Δημαρχίαν μέντοι μετιών Σύλλα καταστασιούσαντος αὐτὸν ἐξέπεσε. διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ γενέσθαι μισοσύλλας. Ἐπει δὲ Μάριος μὲν ὑπὸ Σύλλα κρατηθεὶς ἔφηνγε, Σύλλας δὲ Μιθριδάτη πολεμήσων ἀπήγε, τῶν δ' ὑπάτων Ὀκτάβιος μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς Σύλλα προαιρέσεως ἔμενε, Κίνας δὲ νεωτερίζων ὑπερομενῆν ἀνεκαλεῖτο τὴν Μαρίων στάσιν, τούτῳ προσέειμεν αὐτὸν ὁ Σεργώριος, ἄλλως τε καὶ τὸν Ὀκτάβιον ὁρῶν αὐτὸν μὲν ἀμβλύτερον ὄντα, τοῖς δὲ Μαρίων φίλοις ἀπιστοῦντα. (Budé text.)

p. 240), Q. Ancharius, as T. F. Carney has persuasively argued<sup>34</sup>), was probably praetor in 87, hence elected in 88, not 89. P. Sextilius, governor of *Africa* in 88 when he turned away the outlawed Marius, is not likely to have been praetor in 88, either<sup>35</sup>). Even L. Licinius Murena is not a *certain* praetor of 88 (*MRR* 2.40 and n. 4 on p. 62). The praetorships in 88 of M. Iunius Brutus and a Servilius *are* assured (*MRR* 2.40-41). Both were sent to forbid Sulla's March upon the city, while Brutus was outlawed along with Marius (*MRR* 2.40-41). It appears plausible to regard both as *Mariani*, though it might well be argued that the Senate deliberately chose one of the *boni*, Servilius, to accompany the *Marianus* Brutus, as an expression of Senatorial unanimity in the face of Sulla's outrageous behavior<sup>36</sup>). In any event, the absence of *enduring* friendship between Sulla and this Servilius seems clear. C. Norbanus, the later *cos.* 83, is not likely to have been *pr.* 88<sup>37</sup>), and was a *Marianus*. Hence, of the six praetors elected in 89, we know of *not one attested Sullanus* or even a (sure) *bonus*, rather one *Marianus* and one of uncertain alignment. Not exactly a (known) Sullan sweep.

As for the two attested tribunes, Sulpicius very likely *was* elected as an associate of the *boni*<sup>38</sup>). P. Antistius, however, as I have argued elsewhere<sup>39</sup>), may well have acted as an agent of

34) "The Death of Ancharius", *Hermes* 88 (1960), 382-384. *Contra*, T. P. Wiseman, *New Men*, No. 25 on p. 212: "pr. by 88". Curiously, neither Spann nor Wiseman nor Gruen (*Roman Politics*) cites this little article by Carney.

35) Sources for this activity in Africa in 88 are Plut., *Marius* 40.3-4; and Appian, *B. C.* 1.62. Cf. Varro, *RR* 1.1.10. See *MRR Suppl.* p. 60; and Badian, *Studies*, 71 f. Cf. Carney, *Biog.*, 59, n. 261; and Balsdon, *JRS*, 1965, 230.

36) Cf. Chr. Meier, *Res Publica Amissa: Eine Studie zu Verfassung und Geschichte der späten römischen Republik* (Wiesbaden, 1966), 224, n. 114; and Katz, *AC*, 1975, 109-110. In addition, reassurance to Sulla (about the Mithridatic command and, perhaps, other matters) might have seemed more credible and/or acceptable coming from a *non-Marian*. Note, by analogy, that the consuls elected for 83 were C. Norbanus and L. Cornelius Scipio, a *Marian novus* and a *nobilis*, selected in order to cement a common anti-Sullan front. Cf. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae (264-70 B.C.)* (Oxford, 1958), 243.

37) See *MRR Suppl.* p. 43; and Badian, *Studies*, pp. 84 ff.

38) See Badian, *Historia*, 1969, 481-490. Cf. A. W. Lintott, "The Tribunate of P. Sulpicius Rufus", *CQ* 21 (1971), 442-453; T. N. Mitchell, "The *Volte-Face* of P. Sulpicius Rufus in 88 B.C.", *CP* 70 (1975), 197-204; and Calboli, *Studi Urbinati* N. S. B 49, No. 1 (1975), 192 ff.

39) "Caesar Strabo's Struggle for the Consulship - and More", *RbM* 120 (1977), 16-17.



Marius in cooperating with Sulpicius against the attempt of Caesar Strabo to seek a consulship of 88<sup>40</sup>). In any case, even if Antistius had been an adherent of the *boni* in late 89 (which I do not concede), the attested election of two out of ten tribunes is scarcely proof of enormous influence on the part of Sulla or of the *boni*. (That Sulla and Q. Pompeius Rufus, the two successful consular candidates, were allied with each other and with the *boni* is not in dispute.) The aedileship of Q. Caecilius Metellus Celer, dated to 88<sup>41</sup>), is also to be noted. In this period, a Metellus would presumably have been able to gain election on his own, even to the aedileship; hence, no particular assistance from Sulla need be postulated, though, to be sure, Celer, in view of the (recent or prospective) marriage of Sulla to a Caecilia Metella, would very probably have been allied with Sulla in late 89. Nevertheless, there appears to have been considerable opposition toward Sulla, *invidia*, felt in late 89, especially among the leading senators<sup>42</sup>). Sulla, then, was not nearly so influential at the end of 89 as Spann would have it (see n. 43, below, concerning Censorinus), though, on the other hand, he *may* have had sufficient influence to prevent S's election to a tribunate<sup>43</sup>).

40) In discussing this Caesar's career (*RbM*, 1977, p. 8, n. 38), I committed the error of querying whether the Social War was responsible for ending the alternation between patrician and plebeian years for the curule aedileships, although the first securely attested violator of the "rule", the plebeian M. Claudius Marcellus, held office in 91, hence gained election in 92, before the war. Cf. Sumner, *The Orators*, 10, n. 3. In the same article (*RbM*, 1977, 45, n. 2), I also mistakenly implied that Badian first dated Strabo's attempt to 89 in *Historia*, 1969, rather than *Historia*, 1957. I am grateful to Prof. Badian for bringing this error to my attention.

41) *MRR* 2.41 and n. 5 on p. 45. Note also the quaestorship of L. Licinius Lucullus, dated to 88 (*MRR* 2.52, n. 5): Lucullus, son of a Metella, in fact first cousin of Sulla's new wife, was a staunch supporter of Sulla (cf. Badian, *Studies*, 153).

42) See Plut., *Sulla* 6.19, discussed by Katz, *RbM*, 1977, 9-10.

43) Interestingly, Spann, p. 5, states that "... Sulla rigged his [i.e., S's] defeat", apparently with reference to the "Σύλλα καταστασάσαντος αὐτῶν" of Plut., *Sert.* 4.6, yet, even if "rigging" is involved, which I have previously denied (*AC*, 1976, 507-513), it would make little sense except in 88, when Sulla, as *consul*, might have been in a position to disallow S's candidature (cf. W. Schur, *Das Zeitalter des Marius und Sylla* [Leipzig, 1942], 134), which is itself unlikely! Cf. Scardigli, *Athenaeum*, 1971, 236-237. In short, no rigging.

Indeed, one might even *hypothesize* that Sulla, when writing his *Memoirs* later, mendaciously claimed credit for S's defeat as a token of his foresight, his early recognition of S's "true" (i.e., negative) qualities. By analogy, Suet., *Jul.* 1.3, recounts Sulla's alleged foresight concerning

Though Spann stresses the demise in 90 of the younger Caepio, S's "patron", I prefer to stress the more recent demise (June, 89) of Didius. Conceivably, the combined loss was behind S's defeat. In any event, it is a mistake to accept the rather obviously spiteful report of Plut., *Marius* 34.4-5, to the effect that old Marius was by now an object of pity, as indicative of majority contemporary opinion<sup>44</sup>). The old man was still alive and potent. In short, no strong arguments for dating S's attempt to late 89 remain. Along with Sumner<sup>45</sup>), therefore, I continue to regard 88, the year of Sulla's consulship, as the preferred date for the attempt.

As for Sulla's unattested reason(s) for opposing S (cf. n. 43, above), I have advanced my conjectures previously: personal incompatibility and S's distaste for Sulla's treason and treatment of Marius led to Sulla's ill will<sup>46</sup>), while the lack of a powerful

Julius Caesar (cf. Plut., *Caesar* 1). Gillis, *op. cit.* n. 11, p. 712, notes, though in regard to the Spanish War, that S "was surely mentioned" in Sulla's *Memoirs*, which were very lengthy (twenty-two books).

The apparent fact that the Marian C. Marcius Censorinus, a special *inimicus* of Sulla (Plut., *Sulla* 5.6; see Badian, "Sulla's Cilician Command", *Studies* [from *Athenaeum*, 1959], 170; *idem*, *Lucius Sulla: The Deadly Reformer*, 10-11; and Gruen, *Historia*, 1966, 51-52) was *monetalis* in 88 (M.H. Crawford, *Roman Republican Coinage*, I [Cambridge, Eng., 1974], No. 346, pp. 357-361) demonstrates Sulla's *lack* of overwhelming political influence, even in the case of a bitter opponent, at least when that opponent had, presumably, powerful backing.

44) Spann, p. 29 and n. 88 - "the ridiculous figure Marius cut at this time [89]" - appears to accept the report at face value.

Political bias of the original source, hence also the strong possibility of distortion are manifest, while Plutarch's own moralistic penchant, his belief that a man's ambition naturally declines in old age and that, absent such a decline, the man is perversely opposing nature (Wardman, *Plutarch's Lives*, 118-119; cf. 141) is also in evidence. Note that the pro-optimate Greek historian Posidonius met with Marius during his last illness (Plut., *Marius* 45.7) and is apt to be the source for, among other fantasies, the report of the old man's last "ambition seizures", as they may be called (Plut., *Marius* 45.10). Cf. Harold Bennett, *Cinna and His Times* (Diss. U. of Chicago; Menasha, Wisc., 1923), 39; Scardigli, *SIFC*, 1971, 36, n. 3, and 50; and S. Mazzarino, *Il Pensiero Storico Classico*, II (Rome-Bari, 1966), 409-410.

45) *The Orators*, pp. 107-108.

46) Ehrenberg, *Ost und West*, 184ff., perceptively - even if with an element of exaggeration - contrasts the eastern, spiritual elements in Sulla's personality with S's western, Italian orientation. Cf. Badian, *Historia*, 1962, 229 (= *Crisis*, Ed. Seager, 35). Curiously, an analogous divergence recently surfaced when American Presidential candidate (and Southern Baptist) Jimmy Carter referred sarcastically to the Zen-Buddhist interest of

patron made S vulnerable to Sulla's opposition<sup>47</sup>). Similarly, S's moderation, likely (in my view), may have restrained him from vigorously attacking Sulla before the latter had taken any direct action against him personally. In that time of strong political feelings, a moderate on his own was not apt to fare well.

#### IV

We come to 87. First, the conversation between S and Cinna critical of Marius, reported by Plut., *Sert.* 5.1-3, and accepted by Spann, p. 36 and n. 3 on p. 242, should not be accepted at face value, as I have argued elsewhere<sup>48</sup>). In each Life Plutarch sought to portray the protagonist according to a preconceived view<sup>49</sup>). Since Plutarch has a generally positive view of S, and since criticism of Marius at this point would present S in a favorable light, as one who had the prescience to perceive Marius's bloodthirstiness, on these grounds – and others<sup>50</sup>) – the story is best regarded with suspicion.

Next, the Tale of the Two Brothers<sup>51</sup>). During the heat of battle, a *miles* serving under Pompeius Strabo during the siege of Rome killed his own brother, a *Sertorianus*. After recognizing his brother and his own crime, he committed suicide. Spann, p. 36, suggests that Sisenna first told the tale, with the intention of smearing both Strabo and S, the brothers' commanders. Sisenna, to judge from Tacitus, did name Pompeius, but the

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a rival candidate. In both the ancient and the modern instance, the spiritual was merely one manifestation of fundamental differences of outlook, personality, and upbringing. Cf., e.g., the contemporaries Sophocles and Euripides. As a final point, Ehrenberg, 194, argues the special closeness of S's relationship to Diana, while, of course, Sulla's patron deity was Venus!

47) Cf. Spann, p. 32; and Scardigli, *Athenaeum*, 1971, 233 and 237.

48) *CP*, 1976, 335, n. 28, and 336; and *AC*, 1976, 511, n. 45. Cf. Scardigli, *SIFC*, 1971, 37-38, 44-47, and 53-54; C. Lanzani, *Mario e Silla: Storia della Democrazia Romana negli Anni 87-82 a. Cr.* (Catania, 1915), 67-69; La Penna, *Sallustio*, 267-268; and C. Corbellini, "La Presunta Guerra tra Mario e Cinna e l'Episodio dei Bardiei", *Aevum* 50 (1976), 154-156.

49) Cf. A. Wardman, *Plutarch's Lives*, 141, regarding Plutarch and Marius.

50) Cf. Katz, *CP*, 1976, 335, n. 28. The suggestion of J. Carcopino, *Histoire Romaine*. Tome II. *La République Romaine de 133 à 44 avant J.-C. Des Gracques à Sulla*<sup>2</sup> (Paris, 1940), 409, that it was through S that Marius and Cinna maintained contact appears very dubious.

51) Sources: Gran. Licin, p. 20F; Val. Max. 5.5.4; Orosius 5.19; Sisenna fr. 129 P<sup>2</sup> (Tac., *Hist.* 3.51.2); and Livy, *Per.* 79.

context of Tac., *Hist.* 3.51, not only stresses the crime of the victorious soldier *himself*, but, indeed, looks back to the distant past (87 B.C.), in contrast with 69 A.D., as a time when both *virtus* and *flagitium* were properly recognized. Thus, Spann's suggestion does not appear to accord with the Tacitean context of the citation. Moreover, if Sisenna had taken a *very* critical attitude toward Strabo, the latter's son would have taken this very ill<sup>52</sup>), yet Sisenna later served as one of Pompey's admittedly numerous legates<sup>53</sup>). To the extent that a smear may have been involved, I wonder if Rutilius Rufus, who hated Strabo, may not have been the source. In any case, the two commanders were not directly responsible. *No* smear at all may have been involved.

Concerning S's career from 87 through 83, I agree that S probably received due reward from Cinna<sup>54</sup>), very possibly, as Bennett suggested<sup>55</sup>), a tribunate of 86 and a praetorship of 83 (i.e., in my view, *suo anno* or close to it). Spann, p. 38, doubts

52) See the discussion (with reference to Rutilius's hostility toward Pompeius Strabo) by Badian, *Historia*, 1969, 473-474. Cf. Katz, *CP*, 1976, 332, n. 19, which should have included reference to W.S. Anderson, *Pompey, U. Cal. Pub. Cl. Philol.*, 1963, 55-57 and 61; and Mazzarino, *Il Pensiero Storico Classico*, II, 412, 438, and 440 with n. 453. Note also the unacceptable tale of Plut., *Pompey* 5 (probably due to the same pro-Pompeian source as portions of *Pompey* 3 [on which, see Katz, *op. cit.*]), to the effect that the reason for Cinna's murder was, in part, his soldiers' concern for young Pompey's safety!

53) Appian, *Mith.* 95; and Dio 36.18-19. Cf. Badian, "Waiting for Sulla", *Studies* (from *JRS*, 1962), 212-213. Note that Sisenna enjoyed very warm relations with Pompey's friend and (also) legate, A. Gabinius (*ibid.*; *idem*, "The Early Career of A. Gabinius (cos. 58 B.C.)", *Philologus* 103 [1959], 89 and 94-97, especially 97, n. 1; R. Williams, *Aulus Gabinius: A Political Biography* [Diss. Mich. State U., 1973], 41-42; and Anderson, *Pompey, U. Cal. Pub. Cl. Philol.*, 1963, 16-18, and 16, n. 46, with the plausible suggestion that Varro "may have promoted the acquaintance [of Sisenna] with Pompey".) See Dio 36.42.4. Moreover, Sisenna apparently wrote his history, which extended down to 79, rather late, when Pompey was already an imposing figure; cf. P. Frassinetti, "Sisenna e la Guerra Sociale", *Athenaeum* 50 (1972), 79-80.

54) I have omitted discussing many issues, in part because I agree with Spann on numerous points, e.g., most of his excellent Appendix on "Sallust and Sertorius", (pp. 209-229) - though he may exaggerate Sallust's quality as a source - to which the valuable discussion of Plutarch's treatment of S's later career by Wardman, *Plutarch's Lives*, 134-135, might now be added. Cf. n. 23, above. I hope to investigate on another occasion *why* Sallust chose to portray S (and a small number of other figures) so very favorably, a topic not yet, in my judgement, thoroughly investigated.

55) *Cinna and His Times*, 65, n. 18.

that S "would have waited" several more years for the praetorship, or that Cinna would have seen fit to keep him waiting. If, however, one holds, as Sumner and I do<sup>56</sup>), that S was born *c.* 123, then 83 would have been about the first year of S's eligibility to hold the praetorship. Contrary to the old notion of a "Cinnae Dominatio", Cinna, once the new regime was established and *inimicitiae* indulged, sought concord and compromise<sup>57</sup>). Accordingly, he would not have been inclined to allow S to hold the praetorship too early<sup>58</sup>), nor does S, in my judgment, appear the sort of man to seek it thus.

Indeed, one might go so far as to argue that, since S was an especial *inimicus* of Sulla, with whom Cinna (admittedly, after initially causing him to be declared a *hostis*) wished to avoid further conflict to the extent possible<sup>59</sup>), that Cinna would make a point of not granting S any special exemption from the *Leges Annales* (i. e., supporting a request for one). It should be recalled that, as Badian has acutely noted<sup>60</sup>), only after Cinna's death did Sulla definitely decide upon war. Cinna could easily have utilized S's military talents (cf. Spann, pp. 39-40) without granting him any special privileges. Spann's suggestion, p. 39, that S might

56) Sumner, *The Orators*, 107-108; and Katz, *AC*, 1976, 511, n. 45.

57) Badian, *Studies*, 215 ff. Cf. Balsdon, *JRS*, 1965, 230-232; E. Pozzi, "Studi sulla Guerra Civile Sillana", *Atti d. R. Accad. d. Sc. di Torino* 49 (1914), 644 ff.; Chr. M. Bulst, "'Cinnanum Tempus': a Reassessment of the 'Dominatio Cinnae'", *Historia* 13 (1964), 313 ff.; M. G. Commisso, *Mario il Giovane e i Capi dei Populares dall' 87 all' 82* (Diss. Laur. Padua, 1969-70), 58 ff.; B. W. Frier, "Sulla's Propaganda: The Collapse of the Cinnan Republic", *AJP* 92 (1971), 588-589, overly critical of Cinna; and Gruen, *Roman Politics*, 238 ff., himself perhaps reacting a bit too strongly against Badian's strong reaction against the old version of H. Last, *CAH*, IX, 264-269. As I argued (with little originality) in *Cinna and Sulla: The Politics of Civil War* (Diss. Harvard, 1972), 140-141, with reference to the initial executions (the "Marian Massacre"), the new regime logically, if cold-bloodedly, eliminated a small number of opposition leaders in order to prevent the cycle of civil war from continuing (Diod. 38/39.4.1 is explicit). As I phrased it then (p. 124), "Neither moderation nor massacre, rather expediency". Of course, also, revenge. Not very uplifting, but, it may be argued, sanctioned by the result, years of peace in Italy. No need to stress the dire consequences of Caesar's *Clementia*. History (ancient and modern) surely teaches the error of extending pardon, much less political power, to those who are fundamentally irreconcilable (cf. Bulst, *Historia*, 1964, 318). The question of what *right* Cinna, Marius *et al.* had to make such decisions (essentially, the point which Cato was to make *vis-à-vis* Caesar) is on another plane, and distinct, though, in *this* instance, answerable.

58) Cf. Bennett, *Cinna and His Times*, 64-65.

59) Cf., e. g., M. G. Commisso, *Mario il Giovane*, 72-73.

60) *Studies*, 228-229 (based on Appian, *B. C.* 1.79), a key point.

even have violated *mos* by failing to observe a year's interval between tribunate (86) and praetorship (85), seems wide of the mark, i.e., out of character for S and contrary to the policy of *Concordia* practiced by Cinna.

As a final point, Spann, pp. 137ff., castigates S, with reference to the seventies, for not proceeding to "finish off" Pompey and/or Metellus Pius. S's generalship is depreciated, perhaps wrongly. As Spann notes elsewhere<sup>61</sup>), S wished to return to Rome, even if it meant living as a private citizen (Plut., *Sert.* 22.7-8, meriting acceptance). His goal, therefore, was a negotiated settlement, not complete victory. Indeed, the utter defeat of either Roman commander might well have stiffened Roman intransigence, or at least S may have thought so. Surely, recent history, with which Spann is familiar, has shown the grave disadvantages, even for those with greatly superior resources, of seeking less than complete victory.

An interpretation such as this seems to me preferable to one which postulates S's repeatedly committing major blunders due to tactical ineptitude. Spann's references to German Field Marshal Rommel (p. 144) call to mind Hitler's order that the panzer forces halt before reaching Dunkirk, a command which allowed the famous evacuation, and which seems to have been due, at least in part, not so much to *tactical* error, as to faulty *strategy*, namely a belief that some negotiated settlement could be reached with the English<sup>62</sup>). More directly pertinent is the

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61) See, e.g., n. 50 on p. 306. Cf. Spann, pp. 195-196, for the not unlikely suggestion that S at first hoped to win Pompey over to his side, to form a coalition (one might compare the later formation of the Second Triumvirate, or, indeed, the scheming of Pompeius Strabo in 87, with which S would have been thoroughly familiar). Cf. Cic., *Imp. Pomp.* 16.46 (Mithridates sent an envoy to Pompey in Spain); M. Gelzer, *Pompeius*<sup>2</sup> (Munich, 1959), 50; Treves, *Athenaeum*, 1932, 142-143; and Berve, *Hermes*, 1929, 202. Interestingly, Corneille, *Sertorius* 143ff., 939 ("Unissons-nous ensemble, ...") [S to Pompey]), and *passim*, amidst Hollywood-like melodrama - and treatment of history - points in the same direction. See also Ehrenberg, *Ost und West*, 196ff.; and B. Twyman, "The Metelli, Pompeius, and Prosopography", in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, Festschrift J. Vogt*, Ed. H. Temporini (Berlin-N.Y., 1972), 851-854, not entirely convincing. It may not be coincidental that, when a special command against the pirates, S's allies, was created in 74, due to the influence of P. Cornelius Cethegus (cf. n. 62, below) it was assigned to the reassuringly incompetent M. Antonius (Ps.-Ascon. p. 259 Stangl; Vell. 2.31.3-4; Sall., *Hist.* 3.2M [?]; and Appian, *Sic.* 6).

62) J(oachim) C.Fest, *Hitler*, Trans. from the German by R. and C. Winston (New York, 1975), 630, explicitly denies this widely held explana-

strikingly analogous report (Appian, *B.C.* 5.143.597) that Sextus Pompey “ὑπὸ δὲ θεοβλαβείας αὐτὸς οὐ ποτε ἐπεχείρησε τοῖς πολεμίοις, πολλὰ τῆς τύχης εὐκαιρα παρεχούσης, ἀλλ’ ἠμύνητο μόνον”. After all, Sextus, like Sertorius, was noted for offering

tion of the command to halt. See, however, B.H. Liddell-Hart, *The German Generals Talk* (N.Y., 1948), 132–136, a convincing presentation of the interpretation in my text, above. Cf., e.g., J. Toland, *Adolf Hitler* (N.Y., 1976), 609–611; and William Stevenson, *A Man Called Intrepid: The Secret War* (N.Y., 1976), 110–111.

Probably, as many have noted, a mixture of motives was involved. Of course, in a sense, the basic point is that Hitler so deeply *desired* such a settlement that he seems to have convinced himself that it was *possible* (cf. A. Speer, *Inside the Third Reich*, Trans. from the German by R. and C. Winston [N.Y., 1970], 228, regarding H’s “illusions and wish-dreams”; and *idem*, *Spandau, The Secret Diaries*, Trans. R. and C. Winston [N.Y., 1976], 18, concerning a later “auto-suggestive euphoria” of H). S, also, who to judge from, e.g., his short-lived interest in “The Isles of the Blest” (Plut., *Sert.* 8–9; Sall., *Hist.* 1.100–102M and 1.103M [?]; and Florus 2.10.2) may not always have been inclined to face harsh reality, could readily have been subject to wishful thinking on this point. After all, it was his last chance. Furthermore, a settlement would have been a reasonable course, one mutually advantageous. Cf. n. 11, above.

Parenthetically, one may legitimately ask whether the interest in the Isles was really that of S, and not substantially, as I suspect, a product of Sallust’s creative writing, i.e., the historian’s constructing a S who mirrors his creator to a suspicious degree, perhaps built upon a Posidonian ethnographic base. See, concerning Posidonius, Ehrenberg, *Ost und West*, 186–187; and Scardigli, *SIFC*, 1971, 50–51. Treves, *Athenaeum*, 1932, 133, disbelieves the Sallustian account; cf. La Penna, *Sallustio*, 273; L.O. Sangiacomo, *Sallustio* (Florence, 1954), 232; and Schur, *Sallust als Historiker*, 230–233, 252, and 255–256. Note that Syme, *Sallust*, 193, believes that the Isles of the Blest were the subject of the *first* geographical/mythological digression in Sallust’s *Historiae*.

In addition, one should recall the correspondence which S *may* have received (note that there is no mention of any reply from S, although that may be due to the circumstances of the report) from Roman luminaries of the highest candlepower (Plut., *Sert.* 27.3 and Pompey 20; cf. Appian, *B.C.* 1.115.536–537, with Comm. and references by E. Gabba, *Appiani Bellorum Civilium Liber Primus*<sup>2</sup> [Florence, 1967; from the First Ed. of 1958]; and Spann, pp. 196–197). With such (apparent) support in Rome and evidence of so much disaffection there – note Pompey’s dire need for supplies in late 75, due, in part, to the failure of the home government to furnish them (Sall., *Hist.* 2.98M; cf. *Hist.* 2.47M; Appian, *B.C.* 1.111.518; Treves, *Athenaeum*, 1932, 135; and R. J. Rowland, *Roman Grain Legislation, 133–50 B.C.* [Diss. U. of Penn., 1964], 172–173) – S’s hopes were not entirely forlorn. Cf. E. Gabba, *Republican Rome, The Army and the Allies*, Trans. P. J. Cuff (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1976), 121 (from *Athenaeum* 32 [1954]), on the “very great importance” to S of “his relations with the democrats in Rome” (though see p. 122). Spann, pp. 119–120 and 196–197, does well to query the reports of correspondence and the consular rank

refuge to political refugees (*ibid.*), while Sextus, let us recall, was active precisely during the years when Sallust was composing his *Historiae*. Both Sextus and Sertorius, no doubt, ardently desired to return home, though the former also desired, indeed expected his birthright, a consulship. Even the murders of the

of the correspondents, but, though both points are, indeed, not assured, I find them essentially credible. Many *nobiles*, as Badian, "Waiting for Sulla", *Studies*, 206 ff. (from *JRS*, 1962), has established, had simply clambered onto Sulla's bandwagon as it rolled by in the late eighties B.C. Would they – *consulares* and others – not have desired to make an advance reservation, first-class, on S's juggernaut (as they may, at first, have viewed it)? Cf. N. Criniti, *op. cit.* n. 28, pp. 422–423.

On the other hand, the similarity between the report of this correspondence and the malicious – and unsubstantiated, though admittedly not impossible – report that many Roman "*nobiles* and *principes*" had urged Ariovistus to kill Julius Caesar (Caesar, *B. G.* 1.44.12) is noteworthy and, again, suspicious, for Sallust, who would have appreciated Caesar's report, perhaps even his terminology, may well have been the source for the report of S's correspondence. Cf. n. 9 and n. 23, above; and, concerning the dubious Ariovistus item, M. Gelzer, "Caesar als Historiker", in *Kleine Schriften*, II (Wiesbaden, 1963), 317–319; G. Walser, *Caesar und die Germanen. Studien zur Politischen Tendenz Römischer Feldzugsberichte, Historia Einzelschriften*, I (Wiesbaden, 1956), 33; and D. Conley, *Tendenz in Caesar's Bellum Gallicum: A Reassessment* (Diss. Yale, 1975), 38–39 and 124–125. Unfortunately, i.e., for my present purpose, D. E. Koutroubas, *Die Darstellung der Gegner in Caesars "Bellum Gallicum"* (Diss. Heidelberg, 1972), 20–41 (especially 36–38), although he discusses at length C's presentation of Ariovistus, provides little enlightenment on this particular report. Observe that both the Caesarian and the Sallustian (?) report tend to mar the reputations of the respective author's political opponents or preferred targets. In short, this motif of curious parallels between events of recent history (or, at least, historiography) involving Caesar and, as it seems (to me), Sallust's account of S, a motif of which additional instances might be found or suggested, is not, I believe, entirely coincidental. I intend to study this phenomenon further in a future work.

Since P. Cornelius Cethegus is – very plausibly – considered one of Sertorius's "pen pals" (cf. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae (264–70 B.C.)* [Oxford, 1958], 280, n. 3), Cic., *Pro Sulla* 70, referring to an otherwise unknown wound allegedly given to Metellus Pius in Spain by C. Cornelius Cethegus, subsequently a conspirator with Catiline, may be pertinent; cf. Sall., *B. C.* 52.33; J. Van Ooteghem, *Les Caecilii Metelli de la République* (Brussels, 1967), 214; and L. Havas, "Catilina en Hispanie ultérieure?", *Wiss. Zeitschrift. d. Univ. Rostock. Gesell.- und Sprachwiss. R.* 23 (1974), 229–32, arguing, *inter alia*, that Catiline had served together with Gaius Cethegus in Spain under Metellus. Gaius may have been a relative of Publius – explicit evidence of *close* relationship is, to my knowledge, lacking – cooperating with his influential older relative against an optimate commander. I would think that, if Gaius had been a *son* of Publius (as chronology would allow), such a noteworthy, indeed, delightfully disreputable background would have been mentioned in our sources.



two somewhat resemble each other as notable instances, paradigms, of *impietas*. I trust that I shall be pardoned for believing that the striking similarities in the reported defensive posture or strategy of the two are not *entirely* coincidental.

In any event, it would surely be unfortunate if the deserved rejection of venerable idealization or high treason (in fact, it should be emphasized, the *issue* of treason) resulted in a Sertorius stripped of his medals, so to speak, and meriting more sympathy than respect<sup>63</sup>). Does not the evidence, bedeviled as it is by the crosscurrents of propaganda, ancient and modern, point to a very superior man, perhaps not *demonstrably* "great", but still by no means just another Roman politician<sup>64</sup>)?

To recapitulate briefly, I have argued that Sertorius was born probably *c.* 123, saw his *first* military service under Caepio in 106–5, and attained some, limited oratorical distinction *subsequently*. Sertorius's extended service as military tribune under Didius in Spain suggests a bond between them, one which need *not* have involved belonging to the *clientela* of the Servillii Caepiones. Unfortunately, we cannot be certain when Sertorius returned from Spain, though 93 is as good a date as any. 91 as the date of his election to a quaestorship (for 90) remains entirely possible, while the defeat in seeking a tribunate of the *plebs* belongs in 88, the year of Sulla's consulship, following Didius's death in June, 89. No Marian, Sertorius joined Cinna during 87 and probably gained political advancement under that *princeps*, holding his praetorship at or near the minimum legal age (40). Sertorius's generalship in Spain should be evaluated in the light of his goal, the right to return home, not complete military victory. Though evidence of devotion to any particular political principle(s) is lacking, it would be most unwise to view Sertorius as without principle(s). Sertorius's life as a whole reveals a very superior Roman.

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63) In fairness, Spann, pp. 205–7 and *passim*, does not entirely deflate Sertorius's historiographical bubble, but, overall, he does seem more sympathetic than laudatory. E. Manni's inclusion of Sertorius among "Gli estremisti di sinistra – se vogliamo usare un termine moderno – ..." (*Roma e l'Italia nel Mediterraneo Antico* [Turin, 1973], 377), in reference to the opponents of Sulla in the late eighties, is, I fear, apt only to mislead the students for whom his book is intended.

64) Florus 2.10.2 (in the Livian, anti-Sertorian tradition) referred to Sertorius as "vir summae quidem sed calamitosae virtutis". The second adjective should not be allowed to obliterate the first in our evaluation.